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1. The Church of England, the established church of the English people, was expected to play an active role in the life of `the nation 'The responsibility of
the Church of England was to play a Christian role within a state that earned the support of Christians; to approve of its policies if they were deserving, to
advise reform if it fell short of Christian standards, and to protest if a particular political course violated its principles.' (1) These perceived obligations to
principle, state and nation were tested during the Second World War when the state required Christian endorsement of the British war effort in the national
interest.
2. Although the Church of England supported the war against National Socialist Germany uniformly and powerfully, and regarded it as, self evidently, a
righteous war, with some clergy unhesitatingly pronouncing it a crusade, (2) there remained the question of its institutional participation. This was answered
in the autumn of 1939 by George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. In an article 'The Function of the Church in Wartime', he wrote: 'There are some who take it
for granted that where the nation leads the Church must follow, and there is no question worth discussion.' Insisting that the Church was not the State's
'spiritual auxiliary', Bell argued that the churches must rise above the clamour to bless and sanctify the war and transcend their respective nationalities to
'strike the universal note'. The morality of the Church must be independent of the wishes and attitudes of national power. (3)
3. Although church-state relations are too deeply rooted in human nature to conform to a single formula or rule of politics, it was Christ's coming and his
fateful command to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to render also to God the things that are God's, that engendered a distinction between
religion and politics. The debates within the Ministry of Information on the correct approach to the churches, and the trepidation with which it initially dealt
with religious issues, plus the inherent caution with which the churches responded, indicated the extent to which church-state relations were an area of
immense ambiguity in wartime.
4. The Establishment of the Church of England in the twentieth century is difficult to define. In the nineteenth century the Church had progressed from a
virtual department of state to a 'highly self-conscious religious denomination, disdaining the limitations, legal insular, and ethical, which history had
created, and deliberately organising itself as the centre of a federation of self-governing churches, acknowledging in England their spiritual home. but
jealously regardful of their individual autonomy'. (4) Such was the opinion of Herbert Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham, who thought the formal connection
a nonsense which could only discredit the Church. (5) It was an issue of which the Church was particularly aware as war approached owing to its robust
support of appeasement. (6)
5. Andrew Chandler has effectively examined how and why the Anglican hierarchy supported appeasement and concluded: 'At Munich the Church of England
quite innocently gave a strong impression of acting as the state's "spiritual auxiliary",' adding: 'If the role of the established church in society was to offer an
appropriate and distinctively Christian response to political affairs, a response which affirmed the moral independence which Anglicans claimed, its leaders
had to fashion a more appropriate, self-conscious and sophisticated application of that principle.' (7) Owing to the impression it had inadvertently conveyed
over Munich, it was important that a similar impression not be conveyed in relation to the war itself. However, an examination of Anglican relations with
the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office suggests that the affirmation of Anglican independence assumed more importance in appearance than in
actual application.
6. The Ministry of Information was an innovation which existed in shadow from 1935 to 1939. While it is nowhere explicitly stated, the early decision to
create a Ministry of Information was clearly a response to the example of Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda. Similarly, the decision to create a 'Religions
Division' was undoubtedly influenced by indications that religion was integral to Hitler's plans for conquest of the Continent. Worried that there existed a
popular distaste in the twentieth century for the admixture of religion and politics, there was concern in Religions Division that religious propaganda could
prove counterproductive and even identify Britain with Nazi methods. Nonetheless, the very existence of what was originally called the 'Religious Relations
Branch' revealed, if not a determination to make use of religious propaganda, a recognition that this was too important an area to neglect.
7. To prevent the appearance of an exercise in cynical exploitation of religion, the willing cooperation of the churches was essential.For several months
prior to war being declared, Religions Division worked in informal consultation with the leaders of the churches. The work was under the general direction of
Mr. Kenneth Maclennan, formerly General Secretary of the Conferences of British Missionary Societies. The reports he prepared indicated that relations with
the churches would have to be handled in an entirely different way from other sections of the Ministry of Information's activities.
8. It was pointed out that by their nature the Churches were ecumenical in outlook and supranational in their objectives, and delicate questions had been
raised as to whether it was possible or desirable that they should be used as channels of publicity. It was concluded that it was of the utmost importance
that the churches and missions, which were themselves international, were not suspected of being used as channels of propaganda by one side in an
international struggle. Confidential consultations with church and missionary society leaders made it clear that these could not be identified with the normal
propaganda work of the Ministry of Information. The purpose of the Religions Section of the Ministry was, therefore, presented simply as the promotion of
friendly cooperation, the passing of reliable information to the different churches and missions, and helping missionary societies to deal with problems
arising out of the war. (8)
9. During the First World War religion had been crudely exploited and Christians had failed miserably to 'be the Church still united as one Body of Christ'. As
the Second World War approached, religious circles perceived it as a test for the viability of the ecumenical movement, whose raison d'être was Christian
unity. In the run up to the war the World Council of Churches in Process of Formation, the institutional expression of the ecumenical movement, prepared
documents to guide the attitude of the churches. In particular, it was stressed that the churches should never present the war as a holy crusade, brotherly
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relations should be kept between churches and it was a duty to prepare for a just peace. (9) Church of England Archbishops, Cosmo Lang at Canterbury and
William Temple at York, were deeply committed to the ecumenical movement, the latter being widely regarded as one its leading lights. (10)
10. Within government circles, it was feared the overt manipulation of religion was as likely to lose as to win public sympathy. Church leaders and the
Ministry thus agreed that the response of the churches to the war must retain an aspect of moral independence. This would also serve to preserve the
Ministry from allegations of using the churches as channels of propaganda. Relations with the Church of England as the established Church were a matter of
particular sensitivity. To avoid charges of collusion, Anglican leaders strategically applied a useful distinction proffered by the Ministry at the beginning of
the war. This differentiated between clerics acting as churchmen and clerics acting as individuals. As Lord Macmillan, the first Minister of Information,
explained to a select group of church leaders summoned to a meeting at Lambeth Palace under the auspices of the Archbishop of Canterbury:
I realise that the Christian Church cannot be used as an organ of propaganda. It is in its essential nature ecumenical and supranational. But I
trust that as individuals you will be ready and anxious to help us'. (11)
11. Individual churchmen, acting in their individual capacities, and not as churchmen, it was reasoned, could be brought into consultation with the Ministry.
This device enabled churchmen to work with the Ministry without, in theory, compromising their ecclesiastical status or the Ministry's propaganda. At the
beginning of the war there were no Anglicans on the staff of Religions Division. By the end of the war Anglican churchmen had not only made a substantive
contribution to the success of Religions Division, they numbered significantly among an initially non-Anglican staff.
12. The British were not alone in seeking to harness the power of religion. Reports received by the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations
(henceforth CFR) suggested that Hitler was well advanced in his plans to manipulate religious forces to secure control of the Continent. (12) CFR was
convinced it could help promote resistance to Hitler in the vital Balkan region. Integral to Hitler's thinking was the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church
had become a Church without a country when irreligion was proclaimed a fundamental law in the Soviet Union and excluded from any participation in public
life. Hitler, unsparing in promises when he wished to secure the allegiance of powerful forces, cultivated the synod of émigré bishops who had established a
headquarters at Karlovci under Metropolitan Anastassy and claimed to be the true representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox
Bishop in Berlin was appointed by the Karlovci Council and by 1937 Hitler had obtained effective control of the machinery of the Karlovci jurisdiction in
Germany and the warm sympathy of the Karlovci Council of Russian Bishops by the granting of considerable subsidies, certainly to the former and probably
to the latter. A strong well equipped 'Russian' Orthodox Church of Germany would be a useful instrument for the permeation of the Balkans and ultimate
domination of Russia. As part of the preparations for the collapse of the Soviet regime and the winning of the Russian people's confidence through
restoration of their Church, it was thought to be Hitler's intention to make Germany a great Orthodox centre outside Russia where all the Orthodox of the
Balkans would naturally gravitate. There was to be an Academy for the training of Orthodox priests and a new Patriarchate at Breslau, the capital of Silesia.
A Russian Orthodox Cathedral was actually built in Berlin. The plan was supposedly for a Unified Orthodox Church which would include the Churches of
Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, the Ukraine, White Russia and Central Russia. (13)
13. Leading Anglicans, concerned by these reports about Hitler's activities in the religious sphere, urged counteraction. Bishop Bell and Oliver Tomkins
suggested Religions Division give financial support to the Paris Theological Academy for Russian émigrés. This would be to enable it to meet the rivalry of the
proposed Russian Orthodox Institute at Breslau under the control of Seraphim Lade, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Berlin, appointed by the Karlovci Council,
with allegiance to Hitler. (14) The Foreign Office indicated support by advising the Ministry of Information in April 1940 that, in view of the political factors
involved, it might be possible to supplement from official sources the funds already supplied to the Academy from Britain and the USA. (15) A.C. Don,
Secretary to the Archbishop of Canterbury, had doubts that a subsidy to the Paris Academy was really the most effective way of countering the activities of
Seraphim Lade. (16) Nonetheless, the Foreign Office considered the Academy's activities worth protecting, proposing in June 1941 that it be moved from
Paris to either Britain, Portugal or the USA. This was questioned by J.A. Douglas, General Secretary of CFR, who felt matters had been left too late to take
effective action. (17)
14. The Ministry of Information, although in friendly relations with the Paris Academy, considered that more effective opposition to Hitler resided within the
Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe, and ecclesiastical circles there were suspicious of the Academy. This view accorded with that of CFR. CFR considered
that, whatever might be done along directly political lines to counter German activity in the Balkans, approaches to the Orthodox churches, as churches,
were important because they exercised a profound influence upon both public opinion and government policy. The Bishop of Gibraltar pointed out that
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could put two and a half million men in the field. Douglas had received letters expressing surprise that nothing was being done to put
the Allied cause before the Yugoslav Church leaders.
15. The Anglican Chaplain in Belgrade, P. H. Sitters, believed that the exercise or non-exercise of Anglican influence could turn the scale not only in
Yugoslavia but in Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. Several Serb Bishops had written to Douglas requesting an Anglican visit. (18) Douglas himself was convinced
that 'the future of the world hangs upon a razor's edge and may be decided by the influence of the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans upon the decisions of
their Governments ', adding, 'What these Balkan peoples need to have brought home to them is that we are not double-minded but believe whole heartedly
that this War is a righteous War and that Hitlerism is a murderous treacherous dragon which has to be slain. If we don't believe that, we ought to call the
war off.' (19)
16 Dr. W.A. Visser't Hooft, the Dutch General Secretary of the World Council of Churches and a recognised friend of Britain, pointed out that the churches in
S.E. Europe were threatened not only by the Nazis, but also by the advance of Bolshevism. (20) He considered the latter threat would make them receptive
to British overtures.
17. At the outbreak of the war Dr. Jackh, head of the Ministry of Information's Department for the Balkans, asked Douglas, a known expert on the Orthodox
churches with a long list of valuable contacts, if he personally would be ready to advise and help the department. Douglas immediately volunteered his own
services and recommended the Bishops of Gloucester and Lincoln and Mr. Philip Usher, assistant secretary to CFR. Subsequently the Balkan Churches were
assigned to the Religions Division whose second in charge, Hugh Martin, a Baptist minister, suggested that a group of Anglicans with first-hand knowledge of
the Balkan Churches should form an advisory body for the Division. (21)
18. These proposals were subsequently approved and recommended by Dr. Jackh's Department following a discussion on 5 October by the Regional Specialists
on Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. (22) Immediately afterwards Martin, explaining that changes in the Ministry would mean delay in
implementing the urgent measures required by the situation in the Balkans, urged upon the Bishop of Fulham that CFR meet as soon as possible to consider
(a) relations with the Orthodox Church of South East Europe, and, (b) the promotion of contacts with the Churches of Scandinavia and Holland. Moreover, he
indicated these measures would be better undertaken by CFR than by Religions Division.
19. Douglas opposed this course, even though he doubted the competence of Religions Division as it was constituted to undertake the approach itself. Apart
from having no Anglicans on its staff, its outlook was directed to religious opinion in America and Great Britain, influenced by, and using methods to
influence, that were derived from the ecumenical movement. Douglas considered this likely to be the reverse of efficacious in approaching the Balkan
churches. But he argued that, apart from its deficiency in finance and office staff, CFR could not wisely undertake responsibility for an approach which was
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of the greatest importance and might well effect the course taken by the Balkan nations and especially by the Bulgarian and Yugoslav States in their
relations with the belligerents and the USSR This was a responsibility which rightly belonged to the Government, delegating it to CFR 'would risk inadequate
action and expose the Church to just and serious criticism.' (23)
20. On 19 October an Emergency CFR Executive Committee decided:
This Council does not feel able to undertake the work of putting the British case before the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans and the Orthodox
Church generally, but urges the setting up of sub-divisions of the Religious Department of the Ministry of Information, one to deal with the
Orthodox Churches of the Balkans and one with the Scandinavian and Baltic Churches. [(9)]
21. Interestingly, the Committee further agreed that the Chairman should privately send names for these Committees. The names of twelve churchmen, six
for a Scandinavian Committee, and six for the Balkan Committee, were subsequently sent to Macmillan by Lang at the request of CFR. Lang made it clear
that these clerics were not to be regarded as working for the Ministry, they were individual consultants whose 'names may be noted and used from time to
time as valuable assessors in regard to matters affecting the Scandinavian and Balkan countries.' (24) Following further discussions, a definite proposal
emerged that an Orthodox and Old Catholic sub-section be set up within Religions Division to be manned by Anglicans. (25) Initially set up on a provisional
basis while the value of its work was assessed, (26) a Division memo on the 'Importance of the Orthodox Church' recognised that: 'No relations that we can
develop with the Orthodox Church are to be despised: if skillfully exploited, they might be extremely valuable. This applies to all the European countries
south-east of Germany with the exception of Hungary and the Catholic regions of Yugoslavia (Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovenia).' (27)
22. The establishment of the sub-section was significant because it revealed that although the Church insisted that 'propaganda of a political character is not
in accordance with its purpose', (28) it was not simply eager to support the Ministry's political propaganda, it wanted to be directly involved in making and
implementing it. The accumulation of Anglican expertise and contacts was obviously invaluable. Douglas alone offered an immediate list of some five or six
hundred people who would be of use to the Ministry's work in the Balkan region. The Division recommended Douglas be made Chairman of the Advisory
Committee proposed by CFR, which should also include the Bishop of Gibraltar and his Commissary, R.H. Cragg.
23. The object of the advisory groups was to insure that the policy of the Division had the confidence of the responsible leaders of the churches. It was also
to insure, as far as possible, the implementation of Division policy of remaining 'as anonymous as possible and to stimulate the Churches to do the work.'
Certain that the success of Religions Division required Anglican participation, but determined not to be implicated in purely political activities, CFR
personnel were placed in the Ministry's service in their individual capacities. Significantly, it was the Church which took the initiative in this direction,
manoeuvering Anglicans into important staff positions.
24. For example, Philip Usher readily undertook the direction of a proposed sub-section on a voluntary basis, but he made it clear to the Ministry that he
would not be able to give his services indefinitely without a salary. He was subsequently appointed as a half-time salaried specialist to the Religions Division.
Cosmo Lang approved his resignation, 'on the understanding of course that it is purely temporary' , from his CFR post and advised that he sever all official
connection with the organisation. It was explained to Usher that: 'It is, in the Archbishop's judgement, of some importance that the public should not get the
impression that the Church of England through one of its official Councils is taking part in the Ministry of Information.' (29) Lang was nonetheless 'glad to
think that the Religious Relations Department will now include an Anglican Priest with a knowledge of the Balkan Churches.'
25. The services of Miss Wallace, CFR's office secretary with expertise in the area of religious relations, were offered to the Ministry which was also advised
of her willingness to accept a lower salary than normal. An even greater incentive for the Ministry to employ Miss Wallace was that she could provide
unrestricted access to all CFR information and documentation. The manner in which Miss Wallace was employed as a Research Assistant in the newly formed
section was illustrative of the lengths to which the Church was prepared to go to ensure Anglican influence within Religions Division while seeking to avoid
the charge that the Church was working for the Ministry:
When Miss Wallace was engaged, the Branch was discussing with the ecclesiastical authorities the kind of relationship which should be
established with the Archbishops' Council on Foreign Relations of the Church of England. It is essential for the work of the Section that the
Branch should maintain close contacts and that the body of information in the office of the Council should be at our disposal.
The Archbishop, however, is naturally anxious that the Council should not be regarded as an auxiliary of the Ministry, but he has acquiesced in a
suggestion that its members might be consulted in a personal capacity and as in no sense representing the Church of England.
With regard to documents and references, it is suggested that Miss Wallace (who has been on the secretarial staff of the Council) should
continue to act for one fourth of her time in that capacity and that no restriction be imposed on her use of the body of information in the
Council's office. The remaining three-fourths of her time would be at the disposal of the Ministry - her salary being borne in corresponding
portions. (30)
26. In May 1940 an Anglican delegation, including Douglas, visited Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria. Arranged by the Bishop of Gibraltar, Harold Buxton, with
the approval of Lang and the assistance of the Ministry, the purpose of the visit was to counter German propaganda aimed at winning support from the
Orthodox faithful. (31) In Yugoslavia the delegation visited the King and the Orthodox Patriarch and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The delegation was
deemed a success, not least owing to the strength of the virulent and persistent indictments from German wireless and press which condemned it as an
'English spiritual offensive'. The positive outcome and the absence of public criticism contributed toward overcoming the 'extreme, even excessive
sensitiveness' of the early planning memoranda which reflected the fear that the Division would be seen as a department for exploiting religion and using the
churches for merely political ends. (32) It also confirmed the value of religious propaganda.
27. Staffed by clergymen and advised by church leaders, Religions Division was naturally aware of the dangers inherent in presenting God as a national
champion. However, as Maclennan explained to the Director General, Lord Perth, in August 1940: 'the Nazi regime has openly derided Christianity and
announced that it is setting up a new religion. The Christian issue has therefore become much more important than in previous wars, where both sides
invoked the same creed.' (33) It became more important still when, following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Britain became allied to a
'godless' state. British propaganda responded to aspersions on its sincerity and spirituality by maintaining that the alliance with the Soviet Union in no way
altered British opposition to communism nor the claim to be 'fighting to retain the spiritual heritage of the Christian West'. Nonetheless, the Ministry of
Information felt their task to be severely undermined and complicated a nd Religions Division was confronted with a difficult situation. (34) Notably, the
Church of England played a crucial role in helping to resolve this complex dilemma.
28. Within the Ministry the creation of a favourable religious situation in Russia was considered an invaluable way of justifying the British war effort to the
international community. Although a degree of ignorance characterised Ministry awareness of Russia's religious life, as indeed was common generally within
Whitehall, they knew it had been steadily improving in recent years, confirmed by the failure of the massive German efforts to win Russian ecclesiastics to
their side. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, newly incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Catholic and Lutheran clergy, generally pro-German and always
anti-Bolshevik, welcomed the invasion and even helped it in some instances. But in the Uniate and Orthodox Polish Ukraine the clergy were either neutral or
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frankly favoured the Soviet Government, despite the Germans establishing a special Orthodox hierarchy in the parts they occupied. German propaganda
transmitted religious broadcasts, scattered religious leaflets, re-opened churches and organised solemn services of thanksgiving in occupied towns. The
German failure to attract Russian clergy can be partially explained by the steady improvement of their position under the Soviet regime. Since 1936, when
civil rights were restored to the clergy, the Soviet Government had been obliged to make many concessions to the Church, which culminated in the
restoration of the Christian week and the compulsory observance of Sunday in June 1940, against all protests of the Godless Union. Such concessions by no
means meant the conversion to Christianity of the Soviet State, which remained officially godless. (35)
29. The Ministry wanted to use evidence of an improved climate for religion in their propaganda and cabled the British Embassy in Moscow for the latest
information, asking: 'Are there signs of greater official leniency? Is the anti-God campaign active? What signs of popular religious revival have been
manifested? In reporting please differentiate between what should and should not be used for publicity purposes.' (36) The reply from the Ambassador,
Stafford Cripps, declared the subject impossible to pronounce upon for a foreigner, although, with regard to Moscow itself he doubted there was a real
religious revival, seeing no significance in increased church attendance other than war-time stress and attributing the inactivity of the anti-God campaign to
a preoccupation with war matters. He thought it inadvisable to make religion in Russian a propaganda issue:
Opposition to religion being notoriously an integral part of the Soviet ideology, I question the wisdom of any officially-inspired propaganda
purporting to show - even if it were true - that the regime was going back on its principles (with the inevitable implication that it was doing so
for reasons of self-preservation). The Soviet Government would not thank us for such propaganda, since they have no more wish to renounce
their principles than have His Majesty's Government to renounce theirs. The only thing which might conceivably cause them to welcome this
propaganda line would be evidence of such a lack of public sympathy in Great Britain for the Soviet war effort as might seriously embarrass His
Majesty's Government in their practical efforts to assist the Soviet Union. No such evidence is afforded by anything I have seen or heard since
the war, and plenty is available of His Majesty's Government's determination to assist this country regardless of ideological differences. (37)
30. Church leaders of all kinds, from the Archbishop of Canterbury downwards, had made it clear that Russia was the victim of aggression and was entitled to
the fullest support from Britain. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, tried to alleviate Christian misgivings about the religious situation in Russia
through an address delivered at an American Chamber of Commerce luncheon. It proved far from adequate, consisting mainly of an account of the legal
position which allowed 'freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda'. (38)
31. The Ministry's main concern was public opinion in those nations which remained uncommitted. Fear and dislike of Russian religious policy had proven an
important reinforcement for Axis sympathisers on the Continent. Britain's alliance with Russia led to bitter criticism in Finland, and doubts in Sweden.
Countries like Switzerland and Hungary appeared adversely affected, also South America, South Africa and the Dutch East Indies. All Axis controlled wireless
stations made play daily with the Soviet's religious record, using it in an attempt to prove Britain's hypocrisy when she spoke of spiritual values. Above all,
the Ministry was extremely disturbed by attitudes within the USA: 'In America this is a serious question. "Shall we fight for Russia?" - sums up the attitude of
unfriendly Catholics and Protestants.' (39) A sense of frustration marked policy-making in Religions Division:
The Religions Division have not felt it wise to emphasise items of news giving apparent signs of religious activity in Russia, feeling that this
would give a false impression of the facts. Sir Stafford Cripps has expressed the conviction that the Russians would not welcome publicity on
these lines.
If at any time the Soviet Government felt able to relax restrictions on the teaching of religion this would be a real item of news worth
disseminating , although to do so now might suggest that Russia was only doing it in desperation.
Religious circles in Britain are prepared to stand by Russia and hope a better day will dawn for religion. They do not want to cash in on Russia's
military emergency to extract relaxations under duress.
It must be realised, however, that the whole spiritual presentation of our case is hampered by the Soviet record (especially by the officially
favoured Anti-God movement). (40)
32. With evidence accumulating of Germany presenting itself in Russia as the champion of Christianity, even of the Catholic Church, official views conflicted
as to whether or not Britain should actively promote religious freedom in the Soviet Union, either through direct pressure on the Soviet Government or
covert encouragement of the Orthodox Church. The British Representative to the Holy See, D'Arcy Osborne, reported Hitler's use of religious forces for
cultural propaganda in occupied Russia, with an eye to embarrassing the British cause with the Vatican and in Catholic countries and warned of the
possibilities of collaboration in the religious field between the Germans, the Poles and the Jesuits. (41)
33. The Foreign Office recognised the importance of being 'able to show to the world that there is not more religious freedom in German occupied Russia
than in Soviet Russia itself.' (42) However, Osborne was advised:
Our general conclusion is that we must be, so far as religious propaganda is concerned, on the defensive against Germany - a not very difficult
task in principle, in view of the uncompromising anti-Christian attitude of the present German regime. But to go beyond this into an active
policy of persuasion of the Soviet Government would at present be useless and indeed harmful. A modification of the Soviet policy in a
direction to satisfy the religious sentiments of Christians here and in the Allied countries may come slowly and unobtrusively, and we will
certainly watch for any signs of this. But with such a delicate growth the slightest forcing may well prove fatal. (43)
34. Reviewing the situation in June 1942, Herbert Waddams, an Anglican priest and Senior-Assistant Specialist of Religions Division, appointed on the
recommendation of Bishop Bell, recalled that the Soviet authorities had many reasons for a deep distrust of Christians outside Russia vis-à-vis their internal
plans for their country. Generally speaking Christian opinion had been universally hostile ever since the revolution, and Waddams saw this hostility as being
the most important single factor in the present situation. He endorsed the Foreign Office policy of non-interference with the observation:
The paramount consideration is that confidence should be established in the minds of the Soviet authorities that Christians outside Russia have
no counter-revolutionary intentions of any kind. This effect can only be achieved by great patience and circumspection. Any interference or
suggestions to the Soviets, however well intentioned, are likely to have the very opposite effect of what is desired. The Soviet authorities must
first be convinced that a spiritual alliance with world-wide Christianity is entirely to their advantage. When that conviction is established
everything else will follow as a matter of course. (44)
35. The wisdom of this policy appeared borne out in September 1942 when the Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev and Galicia, Exarch of the Ukraine and
administrator of the Moscow Patriarchate visited the diplomatic corps in Kuibyshev and presented a copy of the newly published Religious Communities in
the U.S.S.R., which conveyed an overly positive account, to say the least, of the religious situation. More importantly, in the course of conversation he
suggested that an interchange of visits between Church of England and Russian Orthodox Church dignitaries would be welcome. Along with this proposal, the
embassy in Kuibyshev conveyed to London its own doubts regarding compliance, reminding the Foreign Office that it was too early to assume any
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fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet Government or the Communist Party towards religion as such and that, without being unduly cynical, one
could conclude that the Government and the Church had come to an understanding, tacit or otherwise. (45)
36. The Ministry of Information was informed about the proposed visit, but was advised that it would not be consulted officially until the Foreign Office had
examined the political aspects of the proposal and made preliminary investigations. It was stressed that the Metropolitan would not have made such a
suggestion without the prior agreement of the Soviet Government. (46) This did not prevent the Ministry from being immediately alive to the advantageous
propaganda potential of the proposal. Martin told H.P. Smollett, the Ministry's Soviet Relations officer, that he wanted the Ministry consulted as propaganda
issues of the greatest importance were raised, not only in Britain but in America and the world generally. Much might depend upon the handling of the
suggestion, and Martin wanted the Foreign Office to recognise the interest of the Ministry before any approach was made to the British churches. (47)
37. Before acting on the proposal, the Foreign Office consulted the Americans who were known to be active on the religious front. For reasons of domestic
politics and as part of his long term plans for a postwar international organisation, President Roosevelt hoped to promote religious toleration in the Soviet
Union. Although the Metropolitan of Kiev had recently been refused a visa to visit the United States, (48) Washington clearly had no objection as discussions
about the proposal subsequently took place between the Foreign Office, the new Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Ministry of Information
and the new Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple. On balance it was decided that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. A major advantage
was an offer from the extremely patriotic Archbishop of York, Cyril Forster Garbett, to lead the delegation. Second only to the Archbishop of Canterbury, his
high rank and personal prestige would generate considerable publicity and make the visit a notable event from the historical as well as the political
perspective. (49)
38. It was deemed preferable for a British delegation to visit the Soviet Union first, with the Orthodox delegation subsequently making a return visit as, it
was suggested, a British delegation could emphasise the potential dangers of openly exploiting the exchange for propaganda and reach some agreement with
the Orthodox hierarchy, and through them with the Soviet Government, as to the conduct of a Russian delegation. The real concern of the Foreign Office,
whose traditional anti-Sovietism remained deeply ingrained, was that the exchange should be so conducted as to maximise the propaganda value for the
Allied cause without becoming a propaganda coup for the Soviet Union. They wanted to make the Anglo-Soviet alliance acceptable, not the Soviet regime.
In this they received the complete cooperation of Temple and Garbett.
39. The Foreign Office considered that if an Anglican delegation visited the Soviet Union, other Christian denominations might wish to send delegations of
their own. The ecumenically minded William Temple had no objection to delegations of other Christian denominations making parallel, but separate, visits.
Garbett, however, was totally opposed to the delegation including or being accompanied by ministers of other denominations. He adamantly told Waddams
that he would not be prepared to go on with the arrangements unless the visit was confined strictly to one from the Church of England to the Orthodox
Church. (50)
40. Like Lang before him, Temple was wary of the Church becoming implicated in purely political activities. He requested that religious priorities be
emphasised and submitted for Foreign Office approval a statement about the visit to Russia which he had revised 'to lay a little more emphasis on the fact
that this is a visit of the Church of England to the Church of Russia and is not a political move in any sense'. He conceded that 'no doubt it may do something
towards helping friendship between the two countries which of course one welcomes for its own sake.' (51)
41. Temple expressed apprehension about the danger of politics being introduced into the proceedings by the Russians as a means of emphasising the
necessity of the Anglican delegation maintaining the appearance of religion being their main priority :
I have no doubt that from the standpoint of the Russian Government the interest in any such visit will be primarily political and that as
concerns both their own internal situation and the appearance they present to the world. But there must be no doubt about the fact that our
interest in it is primarily religious. I imagine this would be understood already but it would have to be quite clear, and I hope the ecclesiastics
whom our delegation might meet would take the same attitude; but we should have to be patient with them if their interest is quite as much in
exhibiting their emancipation from something like solitary confinement as in the promotion of Christian brotherhood. There is all the more
reason why we should be quite clear that the latter is our real aim. Of course I know this is what is uppermost in your mind. (52)
42. As Temple no doubt knew, it was not at all what was uppermost in the Division's mind. Martin, moreover, made this clear by defending the legitimacy of
the political purpose and in such a way as to intimate that he and Temple alike knew that political and not religious considerations were at the heart of the
visit's raison d'etre. Nonetheless, he agreed with Temple that the British had to present an appearance of religious interests predominating.
43. Despite insisting that the visit was solely for religious reasons, the Church of England opposed any discussion of substantive religious issues. There was no
question, for example, of reunion discussions. Officially the exchange was presented simply as a gesture of goodwill; unofficially it was much more, as an
assessment sent to Temple by Martin, examining Soviet motives behind the proposal and indicating British interest, clearly revealed. (53) It included, for
example, the results of a survey which covered 'the more intelligent members of all sections of the population' which demonstrated that of all those who felt
there were obstacles to a proper understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, 72% named Soviet treatment of religion as the chief difficulty.
(54)
44. Temple's caution was partially influenced by his concern that post-war relations with the German churches might be adversely affected should the
Anglican Church appear to have been implicated in a purely political exercise with the Russian Orthodox Church. He explained to Martin: '... one of the
things to be watched is our relationship with the German Church in years to come: I expect the Russian Church is not very sensitive about the avoidance of
its own utilisation for genuinely political ends.' (55) Temple thought the Russian Church too subservient to its communist masters for whom he had a natural
aversion, articulated during his preparation of a statement opposing fascism for the Foreign Office: 'I do not think there need be any difficulty about this,
apart from my difficulty of distinguishing between Fascism and Communism!' (56)
45. Temple's reservations about certain aspects of Church participation in the war effort were not shared by his co-primate. Garbett appeared largely
unconcerned by the implications of the visit or his role. He was well briefed by the Foreign Office which arranged for him to meet significant statesmen
whom it was felt would provide him with a clearer, deeper insight into what was expected of him. These included Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary,
Kenneth Grubb, Controller of Overseas Propaganda and Ivan Maisky, the Russian Ambassador. He also received confidential reports from the Foreign Office,
the Ministry of Information and the British embassy in Moscow. These papers were provided for the archbishop's information with requests they be returned
to source; little therefore remains in his private papers, apart from the instructions for their return. (57) One Ministry memorandum, 'Religion in the Soviet
Union', Garbett omitted to return. The guidelines it gave for Ministry propaganda toward this subject notably influenced the content of the speeches he
subsequently gave on this question following his return from Moscow. The memorandum stated:
The main purpose of any propaganda by the Ministry in this connection will be to explode the German claim that they are the leaders of a
Christian crusade against Godless Bolshevism. Here it is useless and extremely harmful to try to maintain that there has never been any
persecution of the Churches in the Soviet Union, or that present day conditions are satisfactory and provide complete religious freedom
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according to Western democratic standards. Such efforts can be too easily and convincingly denied, and they also have the effect of offending a
great many Christians who know very well that such statements do not correspond to the facts.
The best approach is probably a positive one. Like the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, Christians in these two countries
look forward to an era of more fruitful cooperation and understanding together, and they hope to develop this without the necessity for useless
recrimination about the past. For a direct attack on the German claim about a crusade it should be sufficient to insist:
1. Christian leaders in the U.S.S.R. are supporting the war effort there in every way they possibly can.
2. The Nazi regime has been notable for a great many attempts to undermine the Churches and to crush Christian leaders. Many Nazi leaders
have associated themselves with a blood and race religion which is nothing more than a return to the worship of ancient pagan German Gods.
Open persecution of Christians is one of the typical expressions of Nazi power, and many examples can be provided from Germany, Norway,
Belgium, Holland and other countries - notably Orthodox Yugoslavia.
In addition to the two points specified above, the following may also be noticed:
3. It is useful to stress that the Churches in Germany, Norway and elsewhere did not take part in pronouncements in favour of the
Anti-Bolshevik crusade although the Nazis did their best to procure their backing.
4. In the long run an important way of countering enemy propaganda about Godlessness in the U.S.S.R., and our implication in it, is to put out
material showing that Britain still stands by the European cultural tradition in law and religion. Information about the life and work of the
British Churches as going concerns is of great interest and value abroad and should not always be narrowly propagandist. Evidence that Britain
is still in some sense a Christian country is quite as valuable in many countries as attacks on Hitler's anti-Christian policy. (58)
46. Garbett insisted there be a formal invitation from the Russian Orthodox Church and deemed it necessary that the Soviet Government express their
approval of the visit beforehand to prevent the Soviet authorities subsequently claiming they had merely given in to the requests of the Church and that it
was purely a private matter. (59) In contrast with Temple's concern that religion appear paramount, Garbett actively sought to maximise Foreign Office
involvement. He stressed to Waddams the importance of constant and close contact with the British embassy, and asked that arrangements be made for an
embassy interpreter and liaison officer to be constantly with the delegation in case 'advice' were required. He also volunteered to call on political leaders if
the Foreign Office thought it desirable. Subsequently, the British embassy in Moscow was informed by the Foreign Office that Garbett would be very willing
to call upon Molotov and would welcome the opportunity of an interview with Stalin, if the embassy agreed. (60) An interview was secured with Molotov but
not Stalin who was said to be away at the Front.
47. Garbett's interaction with the various departments of state and officialdom was such that when at one point it seemed possible that medical reasons
might prevent his undertaking the venture, there was consternation within the Ministry. Martin confided to Temple, 'If I may express an opinion on the point
it would be a great disappointment to me if it was not possible for the Archbishop of York to undertake this visit as he seems to be in every way the ideal
person for it'. (61) The Foreign Office were equally impressed with the archbishop. Anthony Eden told him:
I gather from the F.O. that things are moving most satisfactorily for the autumn visit.
They are very pleased with your mastery of the subject! And think you the ideal person.
Let me know if I can help at all. (62)
48. While the Ministry and the churches were now much more relaxed about wartime cooperation, it remained essential to the efficacy of Ministry
propaganda that the churches maintain an appearance of acting independently rather than under state direction. This engendered lengthy correspondence
between the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office about the matter of under whose auspices Garbett's visit was to be conducted and who was to
provide the finance, as the Foreign Office wanted to ensure that the Church appeared 'an independent agent' and not 'under the direction of the Foreign
Office'. They were therefore 'doubtful whether from the Church's point of view , it is wise for H.M.G. to pay the expenses' as this 'would give a political
colouring to the whole thing'. (63)
49. These considerations were put to Garbett by Martin who advised the archbishop that while there was no difficulty in 'producing the necessary funds',
there was concern that Garbett 'might be put in an embarrassing position afterwards if you are asked who paid for the journey and had to explain that the
Government did'. This might be seen to infer 'that the Church was being used for political ends'. (64) Garbett fully understood the dilemma, which he
discussed with Temple, who rather practically responded: 'I do not think we should let the Government pay for us unless it is paying for the other delegations
that go out; but if they pay for all those whose visits they facilitate, of course they may as well pay ours also.' (65) Temple was willing to provide some of the
cost. Garbett considered the affair of such importance that he was quite prepared to pay his own passage from funds available to him at York if need be:
'The possibilities of the visit are so important that I should not like the question of cost to stand in the way.' (66)
50. The Treasury subsequently received notification from Warner that Mr. Eden trusted that the Treasury authority would be forthcoming for the Foreign
Office to meet the travelling expenses of the Anglican delegation from Subhead 1 (Special Missions) of the Diplomatic and Consular Vote. Included was an
explanation that though the Ministry of Information had an interest in the affair, they felt, and Mr. Eden thought quite rightly, that it would be better for
them not to handle the financial aspect so as to avoid the tinge of propaganda with which the Ministry was naturally associated. (67) Initially the Treasury
was reluctant to authorise the expenditure, opining that the Church of England should pay the fares, but suggesting the British Council as a feasible
alternative to the Foreign Office to carry the expenses if the Church was not forthcoming. To this proposal the Foreign Office replied, 'the same objection
applies as in the case of the Ministry of Information, namely that we were anxious that there should be no taint of propaganda about the visit.' (68)
Eventually the Treasury agreed that '... in view of the great political importance attached to the trip, we will agree as a very special case, to the cost of the
air passages being borne out of Foreign Office funds.' (69)
51. An alteration made by Waddams to a goodwill message prepared by Temple for the Russian Patriarch tellingly revealed that propaganda was prioritised
with the Church's acquiescence. Temple made no objection to the changes made by Waddams who explained:
In the phrase 'We share with all our countrymen the admiration and gratitude' I have omitted 'and gratitude' at the request of our Soviet
Relations Division, as we are anxious not to express too much gratitude to the Soviet Union, because to do so is to play their game. (70)
52. Just prior to Garbett's departure for Moscow, the news was received that Stalin had agreed to the meeting of a Sobor (an ecclesiastical synod, council or
assembly of the Eastern Orthodox Church) for the election of a new Patriarch, not allowed since the revolution. Waddams considered this exceedingly
significant event and the timing of its announcement to be a consequence of the forthcoming Anglican visit to the Russian Church. (71)
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53. Garbett was accompanied to Russia by Waddams and another Anglican cleric, Francis House. Like Waddams, House was also connected to Britain's
wartime propaganda machinery. He worked for the BBC. The delegation departed for Moscow on 15 September 1943, carrying a joint message from Garbett
and Temple which expressed sympathy and admiration for the Russian Church and people and affirmed the unity of their two churches in the service of the
Lord. (72) No mention was made of fascism as the intended joint statement had been abandoned at the request of the Metropolitan Nikolai. (73) Garbett was
the first Archbishop of York to visit Russia since the more private and informal visit of Archbishop Maclagan in 1897. Made at a time when the tide of war was
turning against the German invaders and the U.S.S.R. was of immense topical interest to the peoples in the West, Garbett's visit was to capture the popular
imagination and project him onto the world stage, transforming his ministry from that of pastoral bishop to ecclesiastical statesman.
54. The embassy was delighted by the highly favourable impression made on the Russian Church and the Russian people by the delegation and anticipated
long term credit. Indeed, the following year Ambassador Kerr was to report to the Foreign Office that the wider facilities then accorded religion in the
Soviet Union were generally ascribed to British influence, a fact which the Foreign Office observed would please the Soviet authorities less than the devout.
(74) Remarking that he saw little likelihood of any set-back in the trend towards allowing a greater measure of tolerance to the Russian Church, Kerr was
certain that the Russian authorities would have observed with satisfaction the favourable references to the present attitude of the Soviet regime towards
religion which the archbishop's visit had elicited in the newspapers of their English speaking allies. In particular, the visit received widespread coverage in
the United States, to which country Garbett subsequently took the message about freedom of religion in the Soviet Union in March 1944, at the behest of
Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, and Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information. Religious groups and institutions in the US were powerful
opinion formers and had already set their sights firmly onto the postwar world. Roosevelt did not want objections to his plans for postwar cooperation with
the Soviet Union, the necessity of which was a major theme in Garbett's addresses to the American people. (75)
55. The one discordant note was that no publicity had been given to a message of goodwill to the Russian nation which, with the permission of Molotov, had
been forwarded to the Patriarchate prior to Garbett's arrival. Kerr rather thought that this was perhaps in deference to the susceptibilities of 'the rank and
file of zealous party members'. (76)
56. Following his return from the Soviet Union, Garbett was in great demand to broadcast, write and give addresses about his experiences and the conditions
he had observed. The extent of the interest in the Soviet Union was such that Garbett found himself inundated with letters and cables. He was even
summoned to a private audience with the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. Peers besieged him when he returned to the Lords. The BBC Director of
Broadcasting in the Northern Region assured him that his visit had caused the greatest interest in the factories, and that his broadcast, 'Postscript', was one
of the most important that they had ever had. Garbett reported to the Archbishop of Canterbury and to the Orthodox Archbishop Germanos on his mission to
the Russian Patriarchate. He was invited to lunch at 10 Downing Street, and with Maisky at the Soviet Embassy; he had an interview with the exiled
President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes, and was informed by the Minister of Education, R.A. Butler, that his visit to Russia 'had had a great effect on public
opinion: it had reassured the timid, and it was good for Labour to feel that the Church had done this.' (77)
57. It had been agreed that a return Russian Orthodox delegation would visit England and that the two churches would maintain a regular correspondence,
exchanging information by summarising the most interesting events and developments in Church life. Apprised of this, the Foreign Office arranged that it
should be kept informed of all correspondence and that it would supervise any programme that might be arranged for the Russian delegation. (78) Waddams
was specifically charged by Warner to keep him personally informed about everything to do with the Russian delegation, plus 'anything of interest about the
Orthodox Church and its relations with the Soviet Government that may come your way.' (79)
58. Garbett also met and discussed his experiences with the Foreign Office Research Department. The account given to F.O.R.D. contrasted markedly with
that released by the Church of England press bureau for consumption by the general public. For example, Garbett's Presidential address to the Convocation
of York struck a defensive note from the beginning, declaring: 'The purpose of the visit was religious and not political.' (80) Garbett also claimed that the
correspondence which was to take place between the two Churches was to be 'on matters of theology and religion'. Equally of interest in Garbett's references
to his visit was that they conformed to the Ministry of Information injunction that while it was necessary to create support for Russia, it was unwise to
generate popular enthusiasm. Garbett took care to distinguish between the Russian nation and the communist regime, in line with Ministry propaganda.
59. There was concern within the British administration that Soviet successes might generate too much popular interest in and too much support for Russia.
Conservative quarters feared that a positive view of the Soviet Union would serve to promote the cause of socialism, and even that of communism.
Garbett's biographer has implied that his attitude to Russia was sympathetic, but that he was an acute observer of the facts who put forward the best
possible interpretation without making unduly optimistic inferences about situations of which he was insufficiently informed. Smyth noted that
Garbett was careful to say 'There is complete freedom of religious worship in Russia today': but, though he was sometimes misreported by
journalists, he was careful not to say, 'There is complete freedom of religion.' Similarly in the life of the Soviet Union he admitted the trend
away from some of the early Communist practices, while making it clear that this did not touch the essence of the Communist way of life. (81)
60. Smyth omitted to mention, however, that Garbett provided a differing tone and emphasis according to his audience. In an address to Convocation he
adopted a discernibly restrained tone, in line with F.O.R.D.'s advice. Thus, where he told F.O.R.D. that there were twice as many churches now open, he
advised Convocation: 'It is also necessary to remember when we speak of crowded churches that there are nothing like as many open as there were before
the Revolution.' Garbett's meeting with F.O.R.D. had a familiar, almost intimate, quality absent from his address to Convocation. Equally absent from his
address to Convocation was a rather significant revelation about his perceptions of his Russian brother clergy. In discussing the Russian hierarchy it was only
to F.O.R.D. that he meaningfully suggested that 'he could trust them.' He confided to F.O.R.D., but omitted to mention to Convocation, that while discussion
on questions of high policy was not allowed, 'on the lower level - details of execution of Government orders, etc. - there was probably even more freedom of
discussion than in England.'
61. The fact was, as Garbett informed Christopher Warner, that he cut his cloth according to his audience. He told Warner that his public speeches were
guarded: 'In speaking privately I have made it very plain that the State is still Atheistic, and there are large numbers of people in Russia who probably do not
approve of the attitude of the State towards religion. Publicly I have been saying this rather more cautiously.' (82) Too cautiously for the Reverend J.C.
Heenan, subsequently Cardinal Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster, who had himself recently been in Russia. (83) Reflecting the growing alarm caused by Red
Army victories within sectors of the Roman Catholic Church, Heenan repudiated Garbett's account of religion in Russia. His response to the large Russian
congregations described by Garbett, House and Waddams, was to point out that in a city like Moscow with a large population, where there were very few
churches, those that were open would naturally appear full. He also believed that these congregations had been 'rigged' for the distinguished visitors.
62. Heenan pointed out that in 1919 the population of Moscow had been two million and there were 560 churches. Now it had a population of four million and
there were twenty-two churches. He argued that not until the Russian leaders had given proof of returning sincerely to the supernatural past of their
mystical land would there be any real change for the better. Heenan repudiated Garbett's version of religious developments in Russia and he passed a severe
indictment on the Anglican delegation: 'Those who, in full knowledge of this fact, still insist there is no religious persecution in Russia are enemies of Christ's
Church.' (84) Garbett was most certainly not an enemy of Christ's Church. He was also, however, an ally of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information.
For Garbett, Church and State were both instruments of God. (85)
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63. During the war the Church of England and the State worked together to ensure an appearance of ecclesiastical independence which preserved the
Church's moral authority. This, in turn, added credibility and potency to Britain's religious propaganda. So successful was this strategy that a recent
monograph on the resurgence of Christianity was able to state: 'After the end of the Second World War it seemed that the realm of politics had finally broken
away from religion'. (86) This was not the case in postwar Britain, nor the United States. (87) In the postwar era both countries put Christian values at the
core of their Cold War anti-communist propaganda. (88) This was facilitated in Britain by the mode of operation established in the war between Church and
State, circumventing popular twentieth century prejudice which was seemingly suspicious of religious and political collaboration.
64. Influenced by the valuable contribution made by Religions Division to Ministry propaganda, in June 1944 Maclennan suggested there were extensive
grounds for paying attention to religious publicity after the war:
In this connection it must be remembered that the Christian Church, Catholic and Protestant, is the oldest international society in existence
and although its fabric has been partly weakened by the acids of modernity there remains throughout the world a network of religious contacts
of very considerable importance.... It is clearly much to the interest of Great Britain that this world wide, though at present inadequately
organised force, should have full scope as an influence for international cooperat ion for all purposes. (89)
65. Maclennan considered the fact that the churches had 'become accustomed to the existence of Religions Division', which on the whole they had welcomed,
would facilitate organised church-state cooperation in the international sphere. He suggested supervision of such an enterprise be assigned to the British
Council as the churches 'would not feel the same difficulty about cooperating with the British Council as they might about cooperating with the Government'.
In January 1945 the Reverend R.R. Williams, a specialist in the Protestant section of the Division, recommended that 'plans should be made for a small office
to be opened, preferably at the Foreign Office, which in substance, and perhaps in name could be an Overseas Religious Relations Branch.' (90) Kenneth
Grubb, a leading Anglican layman as well as Controller of Overseas Propaganda in the Ministry, supported this suggestion. Stressing the part played in British
history and contemporary British thought by religion, Grubb argued
the desire of the religious bodies themselves to pursue their own international connections is a spontaneous one and they need, not so much
stimulation, as some guidance and help which would seem most naturally to come from the Foreign Office.
66. Grubb was right, as revealed by arguments put to CFR's Peace Aims Group by Waddams. Developing the theme as early as February 1944 that the problem
of postwar reconstruction could 'legitimately be termed a spiritual problem', Waddams posited that
Our experience in this war has conclusively shown how political objectives are related to religious beliefs. For purposes of work the two may be
separated, but they must go hand in hand and must not be allowed to be contradictory in any particular. The religious and the political must be
two aspects of the same activity. (91)
67. Following the war, Waddams replaced Douglas as secretary of CFR and developed a close working relationship with the Foreign Office, in particular with
IRD, its anti-communist section. Equally of interest, the Archbishop of York became a renowned ecclesiastical statesman, travelling all over the globe,
speaking in support of British policies and, in particular, promoting the anti-communist, anti-Soviet Cold War consensus. Garbett had committed himself to
the war effort without qualification and his wartime service on behalf of the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office profoundly shaped his attitude
towards propaganda and to serving his country. In 1945 Winston Churchill described him as the 'Archiepiscopal Ulysses'. This acclamation from the nation's
preeminent war- leader gives some indication of the esteem accorded the archbishop in the political realm by the end of the war. (92) For Garbett and
Waddams, the war confirmed their perceptions that the secular and spiritual were complementary. In the Cold War which followed the World War, both
became Cold Warriors, helping the state resist another enemy of God, this time Stalin instead of Hitler.
68. The nature of the relationship between Church and State was viewed by Garbett and Waddams from a perspective common to the Anglican leadership,
not as the subjugation by one of the other, but a partnership equally beneficial to both. (93) The wartime cooperation of the Church of England with
Religions Division illustrated the prevalent conviction of its hierarchy that though there are two foci in man's life - God and country - these two apparently
rival allegiances could somehow be reconciled to the common benefit of both without compromising the Church's moral authority.
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